

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00478 01 OF 02 282316Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----282335 080606 /70

R 281302Z FEB 77

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 4293  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI UAE  
USINT BAGHDAD IRAQ  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA  
AMEMBASSY DOHA QATAR  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT OMAN  
AMEMBASSY SANA YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MANAMA 0478/1

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR, XF, BA

SUBJECT : BRIEFING OF BAHRAINI PRIME MINISTER AND FONMIN  
ON RIYADH MEETING

1. MEETING WITH FONMIN FEB. 27 TO BRIEF HIM ON SECRETARY'S TRIP WAS EXPANDED BY FONMIN TO INCLUDE PRESENTATION TO PRIME MINISTER. LATTER WAS INTERESTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN BILATERAL MATTERS AND FONMIN ASKED TO SEE ME AGAIN MARCH 1 FOR FULLER DISCUSSION OF OTHER ASPECTS SECRETARY'S TRIP. I WILL PRESENT SECRETARY'S ANTI-BOYCOTT LEGISLATION STATEMENT AT MARCH 1 MEETING.

2. BEFORE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED US, I REVIEWED FOR FONMIN SECRETARY'S PERCEPTIONS FROM HIS MID-EAST TRIP. EMPHASIZING USG'S COMMITMENT TO MOVING AHEAD THIS YEAR TOWARD SETTLEMENT, I ALSO STRESSED DIFFICULTIES WHICH SECRETARY PERCEIVES AND  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MANAMA 00478 01 OF 02 282316Z

HIS CONCERN THAT SENSE OF URGENCY AND FEELING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES PROPITIOUS FOR SETTLEMENT NOT BE TRANSLATED INTO OVERLY OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATION FOR SETTLEMENT IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER. FONMIN PLEASED TO HEAR THAT PARTIES PREPARED FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE THIS YEAR, IF PROCEDURAL ASPECTS CAN BE SETTLED, AND AGREED THAT ARAB STATES INVOLVED DO NOT YET HAVE AGREED WAY TO HANDLE QUESTION OF PLO ATTENDANCE. HE WISHED TO NOTE,

HOWEVER, THAT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE WILL BE HARMED IF ARAB STATES DO FIND "REASONABLE" WAY TO INCLUDE PLO AND US THEN UNABLE MOVE ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH PLO. I TOLD HIM THAT KEY TO PROCEDURAL SUCCESS WOULD BE PLO ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND NOTED SECRETARY'S HOPE THAT PLO WILL MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AT MARCH MEETING OF PNC.

3. FONMIN AGREED THAT CORE ELEMENTS OF A MID-EAST SETTLEMENT ARE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, WITHDRAWAL, AND PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE MADE USUAL POINT THAT IF PALESTINIAN STATE ACCEPTED, AND ISRAEL WITHDRAWS TO PRE-67 BORDERS, PEACE WILL THEN EVOLVE. I TOLD HIM THAT PEACE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ON BASIS HE DESCRIBED. TANGIBLE AND SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF PEACE AND NORMALIZATION MUST BE AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL BEFORE IT WOULD AGREE TO ANY WITHDRAWAL. ARABS DOING CAUSE OF PEACE DISSERVICE BY THEIR EMPHASIS ON WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED ONLY BY VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN EVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TOWARD NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ARAB PARTIES TO DISPUTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERING NOW PRECISE NATURE AND TIMING OF ELEMENTS OF REAL PEACE THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO OFFER IN NEGOTIATIONS.

4. I REVIEWED FOR FONMIN SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON ARM SALES GENERALLY AND, SPECIFICALLY, HIS STRONG IMPRESSION THAT ALL AREA LEADERS WANT VERY MUCH TO REDUCE THEIR ARMS BURDENS. I DESCRIBED FOR FONMIN NEW ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS REDUCTIONS WORLDWIDE AND IN GENERAL TERMS STEPS -- INTERNALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY -- WHICH USG HAS TAKEN AND PLANS TO TAKE TOWARD THIS END. FONMIN SAID ARMS REDUCTION IS WORTHY GOAL AND EXPRESSED EXPECTATION THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MANAMA 00478 01 OF 02 282316Z

WOULD IMPACT IN GULF AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE. I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BUT THAT SPECIFICS OF NEW APPROACH AS IT MIGHT RELATE TO THIS REGION NOT YET WORKED OUT, THOUGH I EXPECTED THEY WOULD BE OVER NEXT 6 - 8 WEEKS.

5. PRIME MINISTER SUMMONED US AT THIS POINT AND FONMIN ASKED ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN MARCH 1 TO GO OVER IN GREATER DETAIL FOREGOING AND OTHER ASPECTS OF MY MEETING IN RIYADH. I SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO BILATERAL ASPECTS WE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED, I WOULD HAVE FOR HIM MARCH 1 IMPORTANT STATEMENT ON BOYCOTT PROBLEM.

6. PRIME MINISTER LISTENED ONLY BRIEFLY TO GENERAL POINTS ARISING FROM RIYADH MEETING BEFORE INTERRUPTING TO ASK IF SECRETARY HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF ON MIDEASTFOR ISSUE. I SAID SECRETARY AND MEMBERS HIS PARTY WERE FULLY FAMILIAR WITH ISSUE AND THAT, FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATION BRINGING THEM UP TO DATE, SECRETARY HAD APPROVED COURSE FONMIN AND I HAD BEEN FOLLOWING IN RECENT WEEKS. PRIMIN ASKED IF THIS MEANT SECRETARY WANTED

TO KEEP NAVY IN BAHRAIN. I REPLIED THAT USG HAD ACCEPTED  
GOB'S DESIRE FOR A "NEW FORMULA" AND FONMIN AND I HAVE BEEN  
DISCUSSING, INFORMALLY AT THIS POINT, WAYS IN WHICH A NEW  
FORMULA COULD BE DEvised WHICH WOULD MEET BOTH BAHRAIN'S DESIRE  
TO CHANGE ITS IMAGE AS HOST TO SUPERPOWER BASE AND OUR DESIRE  
TO RETAIN CERTAIN FACILITIES HERE. SECRETARY DEFINITELY  
WANTED ME TO CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER FIND OUT  
SOON IF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMAT FOR NAVY IS POSSIBLE. I  
TOLD HIM THAT FROM INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FONMIN I BELIEVED  
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MEET BOTH OUR NEEDS AND THAT SUCCESS  
IN THIS EFFORT WILL STRENGTHEN OUR ALREADY STRONG RELATIONSHIP.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MANAMA 00478 02 OF 02 282314Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----282337 080579 /70

R 281302Z FEB 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 4294  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI UAE  
USINT BAGHDAD IRAQ  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA  
AMEMBASSY DOHA QATAR  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT OMAN  
AMEMBASSY SANA YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MANAMA 0478/2

EXDIS

FONMIN AGREED.

7. PRIMIN SAID HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT NEW US ADMINISTRATION  
WOULD PURSUE POLICY OF PULLING BACK MILITARILY ALL OVER  
WORLD AND, THEREFORE, WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN KEEPING NAVY  
IN THIS REGION. I REPLIED THAT WHILE NEW TEAM IS REVIEWING  
US STANCE ABROAD, THIS IS NORMAL FOR ANY NEW ADMINISTRATION  
AND SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED IN ALARMIST TERMS. SPEAKING PER-  
SONALLY, I SAID I FELT THAT TYPE OF NEW ARRANGEMENT WHICH  
FONMIN AND I ARE WORKING TOWARD -- OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS  
AT LOWERED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS -- SEEMED TO ME TO

BE OF A KIND WHICH SHOULD FIT WELL WITH NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES. PRIMIN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT MIDEASTFOR HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN RIYADH AND THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION HAD APPROVED THE SEARCH FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BAHRAIN AND US NAVY, WHICH HE SAID HE HOPED WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. PRIMIN WONDERED IF SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MANAMA 00478 02 OF 02 282314Z

MIDEASTFOR WITH SAUDIS. I SAID I DID NOT BELIEVE HE HAD BUT THAT I WOULD CHECK. PLEASE ADVISE.

8. COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR FONMIN'S INDIRECT REFERENCE TO SUBJECT, PARA 4 ABOVE, NEITHER HE NOR PRIME MINISTER RAISED ISSUE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR BAHRAIN IN EXCHANGE FOR CONTINUING NAVY ACCESS TO FACILITIES HERE. WHILE FAILURE TO RAISE THIS POINT IS NOT SURPRISING IN FONMIN'S CASE, SINCE HE IS OPPOSED TO GOB SPENDING MORE ON ARMS, PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN STRONG ALLY OF CROWN PRINCE/DEFENSE MINISTER IN LATTER'S DESIRE TO GET SUBSTANTIAL ARMS FROM US IN EXCHANGE FOR NAVY PRESENCE HERE.  
CLUVERIUS

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DEBRIEFINGS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, PEACE PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 28-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977MANAMA00478  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770069-0185  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** MANAMA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t1977023/aaaaacqi.tel  
**Line Count:** 195  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 498617c5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3289762  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BRIEFING OF BAHRAIN PRIME MINISTER AND FONMIN ON RIYADH MEETING  
**TAGS:** PFOR, XF, BA, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (KHALIFA, KHALIFA IBN SALMAN AL), (KHALIFA, MUHAMMAD IBN MUBARAK)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/498617c5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009